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ABSTRACT 
This paper compares the outcomes of several basic types of allocation 
systems which are commonly employed in developing countries and centrally 
planned economies to distribute certain goods among individuals. The 
allocation systems (to distribute the limited supply of a deficit good) 
that we compare are: convertible and non-convertible rations, the queue 
system with and without secondary trade, the bundling of goods (in which 
the deficit good is bundled with some other good), and non-intervention 
(that is, the unhindered market). Our analysis focusses on obtaining 
positive results: for each pair of allocation systems, we attempt to 
ascertain whether a specific group of individuals (particularly the rich 
and the poor) is better-off under one allocation system or another. The 
resulting insights and conclusions are valid and_informative, regardless 
of the social criterion (or political reasons) based on which a government 
might choose an allocation system. 
Among the results we obtain are that, for the poor, the ranking of al­
location systems (from better to worse) is: convertible rations, non­
convertible rations, the queue system without secondary trade, and non­
intervention. The queue system, thus, does not turn out to be relatively 
as beneficial to the poor as it is often thought to be. The bundling 
system _is shown to be inferior for the poor than either convertible or 
non-convertible rations. The rich are found to be better-off under non­
intervention than under most other allocation systems. Also, contrary to 
the common belief, we show that a rationing system with convertibility is 
not weakly Pareto superior to the one without convertibility. These and 
other results are notably robust not only to many of the parameters of the 
economy, but also to certain types of commodity taxes (and subsidies) and 
administrative costs. 
QUEUES, RATIONS AND MARKET: 
COMPARISONS OF OUTCOMES FOR THE POOR AND THE RICH 
Raaj Kumar Sah* 
Governments in less developed countries and centrally planned econo­
mies employ a variety of 'non-market' systems to allocate certain goods 
among individuals. Among the most common systems are the rationing and the 
queue systems. 1
 Also, there are differences in how a particular system 
functions; in some rationing and queue systems, the rationed good is not 
convertible (that is, individuals can not exchange this good in secondary 
markets) whereas it is partly or fully convertible in others. Such dif­
ferences, as we shall see, have important economic implications. 
Each of the above allocation systems leads to a markedly different 
distribution of welfare among various individuals in the economy, and 
these welfare distributions are quite different, in turn, from the one 
that would emerge if the government ~ere not intervening. The primary 
objective of this paper is to compare the welfare of specific groups of 
individuals (particularly the poor and the rich) when the limited supply 
of a good (the deficit good) is allocated through alter~ative allocation 
systems, including non-intervention. We do this in two steps: (i) we 
ascertain the utilities of various groups of individuals under each of a 
number of allocation systems, and then (ii) we take each pair of alloca­
tion systems and attempt to determine whether a specific group of 
individuals is better-off under one allocation system or another. 
This analysis is strictly positive and, therefore, the results and 
1 
2 
insights we obtain are valid and informative, regardless _of the social 
criterion (or political reasons such as the unwillingness to allow an in­
crease in the market price) based on which a government might choose an 
allocation system. Furthermore, our comparisons of individuals' welfare, 
particularly of the poor, under alternative allocation systems are central 
to typical policy debates. For instance, a main argument often given in 
favor of the queue or the ration system is that (since direct income sub­
sidies to the poor are not feasible) these allocation systems might be 
effective ways of helping the poor. Our analysis helps to recognize some 
of the circumstances when such arguments are useful. We should stress, 
however, that it is not the objective of this paper to analyze the socie­
tal desirability of alternative allocation systems; such an analysis 
must necessarily be based on some normative criterion. 
The allocation systems which we compare are: non-intervention, con­
vertible and non-convertible rations, and the queue system with and 
2
without secondary trade. Another allocation system that we examine is 
the bundling system (in which the deficit good is bundled with some other 
good). We use relatively simple model_s to depict each of these allocation 
systems. Among the results we obtain are the following. 
(i) For the poor, the ranking of allocation systems (from better !.Q. 
~) is: convertible rations, ™-convertible rations, the gueue system 
without secondary trade, and !!QP.-intervention. The queue system, thus, 
does not turn out to be relatively as beneficial to the poor as it is 
often thought to be. Also, governments frequently attempt to enforce non­
convertibility of rations. Such an emphasis is potentially harmful to the 
poor. 
3 
( ii) The rich ~ better-off under .!!-.Q.!!.-intervention than they ~ 
under rations (convertible .2.!. fil?_!!-convertible) .2.!. the gueue system (with 
.2.!. without secondary trade). Also, the rich .!tf£. better-off under convert­
ible rations .2.!. the gueue system with secondacy trade than they~ under 
the gueue system without secondary trade. These results, as we shall see, 
are understandable consequences of the high wages and large endowments 
that the rich typically have. 
(iii) It is often believed that no one can be worse-off, and some 
individuals would be better-off, under convertible rations than under non­
convertible rations, because there are gains to trade in the former sys­
tem. We show this view to be incorrect; that is: Convertible rations 
~ not weakly Pareto superior !.Q. fil?_!!-convertible rations. The reason 
behind this counter-intuitive result is that the convertibility of rations 
influences individuals' endowments by affecting their incentives to buy 
the deficit good from ration shops and, therefore, the standard gains to 
trade arguments do not apply here. 
(iv) Secondary trade in a queue system can generate additional 
employment opportunities for the poor because, under this system, they are 
the ones who typically stand in queues, not only for themselves but also 
for others. This has sometimes prompted suggestions that the poor are 
better-off in a queue system with secondary trade than in the one without 
it. We show that such a view is not always correct because, though the 
poor might get a higher wage when there is secondary trade, they also may 
face a higher opportunity price for the deficit good. 
(v) The poor.!.!£. better-off under either convertible .2.!. .!!-.Q.!!.­
convertible rations than they.!.!£_ under the bundling system, if the income 
elasticities of the deficit and the bundled goods.!.!£. constant and close 
4 
to ™ another, and if there is secondary trade in at least one of the ·two 
goods. Under the ~ conditions, the rich .!.!'£_ better-off under 
™-intervention than they.!.!'£. under the bundling system. 
A methodological aspect of this paper is that the standard tools of 
marginal analysis are not usable here because alternative allocation 
systems result in equilibria which can not be assumed to be in the neigh­
borhood of one another. Yet, as we shall see, our results are robust not 
only to many of the parameters of the economy but also to certain types of 
commodity taxes and administrative costs. Moreover, an obvious strength 
of our pairwise comparisons among alternative systems is that the compari­
son between any two systems does not depend on whether some other system 
is considered feasible or not. For instance, non-intervention may not be 
a realistic alternative in certain contexts; particularly, in centrally 
planned economies. In these contexts, the relevant comparisons are those 
which we conduct among alternative government managed systems (that is, 
among ration, queue, and bundling systems). 
The comparison of outcomes of alternative allocation systems has not 
received as much attention in the literature as it deserves. A central 
contribution is that by Weitzman (1977) in which he com.pared, based on a 
specific social criterion, the allocation of a fixed quantity of the 
deficit good through non-convertible rations versus a 'price system.•
3 
The present paper differs from Weitzman's in not only the scope (we com­
pare many important allocation systems in addition to the two that he 
does) and the emphasis (ours is on obtaining positive results, whereas his 
is on normative analysis based on a specific social criterion), but also 
in the underlying model of the 'price system.' The last point concerns 
the fact that there are profits in the economy if the market clearing 
5 
price of the deficit good is higher than its unit cost. The distribution 
of these profits among individuals, no matter what it is, affects not only 
the welfare and the consumption of individuals but also the market clear­
ing price. Though Weitzman notes the critical role that the distribution 
of these profits plays in determining the outcome of the 'price system,' 
his model assumes that the profits disappear altogether. In our analysis, 
we take into account the distribution of profits; for instance, under 
non-intervention, the profits accrue to individuals in proportion to their 
ownership of the firms which own the deficit good. 
This paper is not related to the important literature which has 
extended parts of the theory of second-best and the theory of optimal 
commodity taxation to instruments such as rations and queues. For 
instance, Bucovetsky (1984) shows that, starting from a second-best 
situation, a government can do better under certain circumstances if a 
queue system (without secondary trade) is partly introduced into an 
economy. Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) show that the same is possible if 
non-convertible rations are partly introduced into an economy. The under­
lying economic reason is simple: the government can not do worse by 
having additional policy instruments (whatever the instruments might be, 
provided it is assumed that there are no administrative costs) and, under 
some circumstances, it may do strictly better, regardless of what the 
criterion might be (for example, whether the government wants an improve­
ment in the Pareto sense, or whether it wants an increase in some social 
welfare function). This literature also addresses the issue of optimal 
rations and queues, given a social welfare function. 4 
The present paper has a different aim. Our motivation here is not to 
study rations or queues as additional policy instruments through which the 
6 
government can·do better, based on some criterion. Instead, our motiva-
tion is to examine rations, queues and other mechanisms as alternative 
allocation systems to distribute the limited supply of a good. Further, 
our focus is on comparative analysis. Therefore, we are not interested in 
showing that a combination of two policy instruments can do better than 
any one of them. Instead, we specify a number of basic types of allocation 
systems, none of which is a special case of another system under consider­
5ation, and compare their outcomes on specific groups of individuals. 
It is perhaps useful to point out another difference between our com­
parative approach and that based on the theory of second-best. In the 
latter, the administrative costs of policy instruments are ignored (though 
these costs are important in practice); in part, because of the diffi­
culties in formulating generalizable relationships between the administra­
tive cost and the nature of a policy instrument. Specifically, the second­
best type results mentioned above, that the government can potentially do 
better by employing additional instruments, are based on an assumption 
that additional instruments do not entail any administrative costs. The 
comparisons undertaken in the present paper, on the other hand, are based 
on an assumption that different allocation systems under consideration 
entail approximately the same administrative cost (that is, the adminis­
trative cost of an allocation system depends on the quantity of the 
deficit good distributed). Furthermore, we show that many of our results 
can be extended to those cases where administrative costs of alternative 
systems are different. Thus, though the present analysis also abstracts 
from an explicit modelling of administrative costs, our treatment of these 
6cos t scan be v1ewe. d as as t ep 1n. the r1g· h t d"1rec t·10n. 
In Section I, we derive the expressions for individuals' utilities 
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under four alternative systems (non-intervention, convertible and non­
convertible rations, and the queue system without secondary trade). The 
method for comparing an individual's utility is summarized in Section II. 
The four systems described above are then compared to one another in 
Section III. Section IV contains extensions and generalizations; spe­
cifically we (i) examine two other allocation systems (the queue system 
with secondary trade and the bundling system), (ii) describe the exten­
sions or modifications of our results when commodity taxes and administra­
tive costs are taken into account, and (iii) point out certain assumptions 
one might have to make in attempting to use our positive analysis as a 
basis for societal (normative) comparisons among alternative systems. 
Concluding remarks are presented at the end. 
I. INDIVIDUALS' UTILITIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION SYSTEMS 
Each allocation system implies a different combination of income and 
opportunity prices that an individual faces and, thus, a different level 
of utility that he (she) has. In this section, we derive expressions for 
the utility levels of different individuals under four allocation sys­
tems: non-intervention (market), non-convertible rations, convertible 
rations, and the queue system without secondary trade. These systems are 
respectively denoted by I= M, R, C and Q. Individuals are denoted by 
superscript h , and n h is the proportion of individuals of type h in 
the economy. n 
h > 0 , and ~h = 1. A summation sign without index 
means, throughout the paper, that the sum is being taken over all h. 
Denote the available supply (per capita) of the deficit good by X, 
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and its unit cost by p. The deficit good is a normal consumption 
good; that is, an individual's demand for this good is increasing in his 
income, and decreasing in the price he faces. Also, individuals' tastes 
are sufficiently similar (though a homogeneity of tastes is not required 
for much of our analysis). so that the demand for the deficit good (at any 
given price) is larger for a person with higher income. For individual 
h
h • X and Vh respectively denote the demand function for the deficit 
good, and the indirect utility function; these functions are defined 
over the opportunity prices this person faces and his full income. We 
assume that the market demand for the deficit good would exceed the 
available quantity if its market price was to be set equal to its unit 
cost. That is 
h-where m is the full income (value of endowment) of individual h if 
the market price of the deficit good is p .7 
Under non-intervention, therefore, private firms (owners of the defi­
cit good) adjust the consumer price of the deficit good to equate its 
demand and supply. Under a government managed system (that is, under 
allocation systems R • C. and Q; and the systems to be considered 
later). the government procures the available quantity of the deficit good 
at its unit cost p • and distributes it through one or another alloca-
8tion system. We assume at present that the price of the deficit good 
that the government charges at its shops is p (of course, the opportun­
ity price of the deficit good would be different under different alloca-
tion systems, as we shall see below). That is, there is no commodity tax 
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(or subsidy) on the deficit good and, correspondingly, there is no public 
surplus (or deficit) under the •!location systems under consideration. 
Issues concerning commodity taxes and administrative costs are discussed 
later. 
hIFor individual h, let X and VhI denote the quantity of the 
deficit good consumed, and the utility obtained, under the allocation 
system I. The economy-wide consumption of the deficit good equals its 
available quantity under the allocation system I; that is 
We now obtain the expressions for yhI for various systems, which are 
needed for later comparisons. 
Non-Intervention: The individual h owns (through partial ownership 
of firms) a~ units of the deficit good. Naturally, a 
h 2. 0 , and 
If the market clearing price is p M then the full income 
of individual h is mh + ah(pM - p)X. Thus 
hM hM h hM Mand x = x (p , m + a (p p)X) • The market price p is obtained 
by substituting the expression for X hM into (2); that is, from 
We restrict our analysis to those situations where the aggregate demand 
curve for the deficit good is downward sloping in its price. 9 The rele­
vant implication of this restriction, in combination with (1) and the 
M Mabove expression for determining p is that the market price p 
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is higher than p. This implication is consistent with the intuition 
that systems such as rationing are typically employed in those situations 
where the market allocation would entail a significant rise in the price 
of the deficit good. 
Non-convertible Rations: In this case, individuals can buy (at gov­
ernment shops) up to a fixed quantity of the deficit g·ood, but no more, 
and resale is not permitted. The superscript R denotes this allocation 
system, and XR denotes the maximum quantity of ration. Naturally, the 
population self selects itself into two groups. The first group consists 
of those who wish to buy the deficit good in quantities smaller than or 
equal to XR These individuals are not constrained by rationing. For 
hR h h _Rthem, x = x (p, m) ix--, and 
The second group consists of those who want to consume more deficit 
good than t', but are constrained to consume only XR. A convenient 
representation of an individual's utility under a rationing constraint is 
as follows [see Neary and Roberts (1980) for details]. Define the shadow 
p
hRprice of the deficit good for person h to be • which is obtained 
from: X h( phR , mh + (phR - p )XR) = XR • Then, this person's consumption 
behavior under rationing is the same as that in the hypothetical case when 
he faces price p
hR 
• receives an income transfer 
hR _R.
(p - p):x--. and 
faces no rationing. Therefore, the utility level of person h can be 
expressed as 
11 
hR 10where p > p The maximum ration quantity is obtained from 
where the first summation is over those individuals who are not con-
strained by rationing (group L ), and the second summation is over those 
who are (group U ). 
We assume that there are at least some individuals (the poorest per­
sons are among them) who do not (or can not) buy the maximum ration 
quantity XR. This, we believe, is a more accurate representation in 
most situations (particularly in developing countries) than to assume that 
everyone buys the maximum ration quantity. From (6), therefore 
(7) t' > X • 
Convertible Rations: If rations purchased from the government shops 
can be subsequently traded, and if the resulting equilibrium price of the 
deficit good is higher than p , then everyone would buy the full quan­
tity of available ration. The ration per person is thus X • If p 
C 
denotes the equilibrium price, then the full income of person h is 
h Cm + (p - p)X, and his utility level is 
The price p C is obtained by substituting xhC = xh (p,
C 
mh + (pC - p)X) 
into (2). Comparison of (8) with (3) shows, as one might expect, that the 
key difference between non-intervention and convertible rations is that,in 
the latter system, the government intervention has equalized the virtual 
12 
ownership of the deficit good. Since the income distribution in these two 
cases is different, p 
C and p 
M 
are not the same, in general. But 
pc> p. given our earlier restriction that the aggregate demand curve 
is downward sloping in price. 
Qµeues without Secondary Trade: In this case, consumers wait in 
queues to purchase the deficit good. The waiting time is assumed to be 
proportional to the quantity purchased. This representation approximates 
those cases where individuals make several purchases in small lots within 
a single decision period; for instance, because private storage of the 
deficit good is expensive. If the waiting time per unit purchase is t, 
then the opportunity price of the deficit good is p + tw
h Thus, the 
utility level of the individual h is 
The waiting time per unit, t, is determined from xhQ = xh(p + twh, mh) 
and (2). 
We assume that the prices of the non-deficit goods (that. is, of goods 
other than the deficit good) and the wage of any given individual are not 
significantly different under the four allocation systems described above. 
What it means is that jf the economy were to switch (hypothetically) from 
non-convertible rations to convertible rations (for the deficit good), for 
instance, then the induced adjustments in the aggregate demands and 
supplies of the non-deficit goods and of different types of labor are such 
that the market price of these goods and labor types are not significantly 
affected. This would be the outcome if, for example, the supply elastici­
ties of the non-deficit goods and the demand elasticities for different 
types of labor are large. 
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II. METHOD FOR COMPARING AN INDIVIDUAL'S UTILITY 
The method to compare the utilities of specific individuals under 
alternative allocation systems is summarized in this section. Specific­
ally, if I and J represent two different allocation systems, then we 
want to ascertain whether the individual h is better-off or worse-off 
under I; that is whether yhI is larger or smaller than VhJ. In 
some cases, such a comparison is straightforward. For notational brevity, 
hI hI
let p and m denote the price of the deficit good and the income, 
hJ
corresponding to the individual h , under the system I . Let p 
hJ
and m denote the respective variables under the system J . Then the 
hI > hJindividual is better-off under the system I if: m _m and 
hI < hJ p _p • with at least one strict inequality. This is because a 
higher income or a lower price (or both) yield a higher utility. 
To deal with the remaining cases, in which one of the two allocation 
systems entails a higher price but also a higher income for an individual, 
define the following metric 
( hI hJ) + ( hJ hI) hJ(10) = m -m p -p x 
hJwhere we recall that X is the quantity of the deficit good consumed by 
the individual h under the system J. Then it can be shown that 
(11) if A
h 
(I, J) 2. 0 • 
A derivation for (11) is provided in Appendix 1, but it can also be estab­
lished through the following revealed preference argument. If Ah> 0, 
then (10) implies that this individual could have purchased, in allocation 
system I, the same bundle of goods as he did in the allocation system 
14 
J. The individual's actual purchase under the allocation system I. 
however, was different. Therefore, the individual h must be better-off 
under I. 
Note that this method does not yield a verdict when the metric (10) is 
negative or when its sign is unclear, but it is the best available method 
for comparing an individual's utility under two different situations, 
without imposing restrictions on his preferences. In the analysis below, 
therefore, we compare.!_! many pairs of allocation systems ll ~ possible 
based on the above general method. 
III. COMPARISONS AMONG ALTERNATIVE ALLOCATION SYSTEMS 
In this section, we compare the outcomes of the allocation systems 
described in Section I. We do this first for the poor, then for the rich. 
In addition, we point out certain important aspects of the comparison 
between convertible and non-convertible rations. 
Comparisons for the Poor: The poor are denoted by h = 1 • Since the 
poor belong to the lower tail of the distribution of incomes and wages, 
their demand for the deficit good is relatively low. In particular, we 
expect a poor person's demand for the deficit good under non-convertible 
rations to be smaller than the per capita available quantity. That is 
lR(12) X < X • 
No special assumption is needed for the poor to behave this way; the 
budget constraint itself will generate such a demand behavior at suffi­
ciently low incomes. Next, we assume that the poor do not get any part of 
the profit under non-intervention; this is a reasonable assumption be-
1 
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cause the poor do not typically possess ownership of firms. That is, 
a = 0, and from (3) 
The last assumption, as will become clear below, is relevant only for the 
comparison of non-intervention with other systems. We now derive the 
following result: The ranking of allocation systems for the poor (from 
better to worse) is convertible rations, non-convertible rations, the 
queue system without secondary trade, and non-intervention. 
Begin by comparing convertible rations to non-convertible rations. 
Expressions (4), (8) and (10) yield 
CUsing (12) and recalling that p ) p , it follows that (14) is positive. 
Therefore, the poor are better-off under the ration system with converti­
bility than they are if rations are non-convertible. The reason for this 
is as follows. Convertibility of rations brings an income gain to the 
poor, but it also entails a higher price for the deficit good. On the 
whole, the poor are better-off with convertibility because the (income 
producing) ration quantity they can get under this system exceeds the 
quantity of the deficit good they consume under non-convertible rations. 
Next, the comparison between non-convertible rations and the queue 
system without secondary trade is straightforward since, from (4) and (9), 
the poor have the same income under these two systems, but they face a 
higher price of the deficit good under the latter. This is because the 
queue system entails an~ cost of waiting, small though this extra 
cost may be for the poor. Thus, v1R > v1Q. Finally, compare (13)and 
16 
(9). The poor have the same income under the queue system and non-
intervention, but the respective prices for the deficit good are p + tw 1 
and p 
M 
Now recall that PM ) p • It follows then that a person with 
sufficiently low wage is better-off under the queue system than under 
non-intervention. 
Comparisons for the Rich: The rich are denoted by h = r. and they 
belong to the upper tail of the distribution of incomes and wages. As one 
would expect, the comparisons between non-intervention and other systems 
depend, in part, on the ownership of the deficit good that the rich have 
under non-intervention. We show here that: The rich are better-off under 
non-intervention than under other allocation systems (that is, under con­
vertible or non-convertible rations, or under the queue system without 
secondary trade), if their ownership of the deficit good under non­
intervention is large; specifically if 
(15) arX 2. xrI • for I= R, C and Q. 
That is, if the ric·h own more deficit good under non-intervention than 
what they consume under other systems. 
The condition (15) is automatically satisfied in a two-class economy 
because, in this case, the rich own all of the deficit good under non­
intervention, but (regardless of the allocation system) the poor consume 
least of the deficit good. see recall that ~huh -- •at some To this, Lil 1 
r r 1This, in the two-class case, implies a = 1/n , because a = 0 • 
. xrIFurth (2 ) 1mp11es. __ (X _ nl.lI)/nr~er, The last two expressions, 
along with the fact that x1I) 0, yield (15). In fact, we expect the 
condition (15) to be satisfied even in a multi-class economy, because the 
rich typically own proportions of firms' shares which are far in excess of 
17 
the proportions of the outputs (of firms) that they consume. 
To confirm that the rich are better-off under non-intervention than 
under other systems (when (15) holds), we obtain the following from (3), 
. 11 
(5), (8), (9) and (10). 
R(pM r(16) Ar (M, R) = -p)(aX-X) 
(17) Ar (M, C) = (pc - p)(xrC - X) + (pM - p)(ar X _ xrC) 
M r rQ tr rQ(18) Ar (M, Q) = (p - p)(a X - x ) + W X 
Recall that p 
M > p • and Using (15), thus, (16) and (18) are 
non-negative. Also, the rich have more than the (economy-wide) average 
income under convertible rations. Therefore, their consumption is more 
than average; that is xrC > X. Hence, (17) is positive. 
We can also show that those with very high wages (which includes the 
rich) are better-off under convertible rations than under the queue system 
without secondary trade. Specifically, expressions (8), (9) and (10) 
yield 
hQ(19) - p) ]x • 
C h CSince p > p • the above expression is positive if w l Cp - p)/t. 
Convertible versus Non-convertible Rations: Often it is thought that 
a rationing system with convertibility must be weakly Pareto superior to 
the one without convertibility; after all, it could be argued that the 
gains from trade can not harm anyone and should help at least some indivi­
duals. Such an argument overlooks the fact that the convertibility of 
rations can alter individuals' endowments and, therefore, the gains to 
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trade argument can not always be applied. In fact, we show that: Con­
vertible rations are not weakly Pareto superior to non-convertible 
rations; that is, certain individuals are better-off under non­
convertible rations. 
In particular, consider individuals whose consumption of the deficit 
good under convertible rations is between X and XR; that is: 
XR 2. xhC 2. X. Among these individuals, there could be two types: those 
whose consumption is not constrained under non-convertible rations, and 
those whose consumption is constrained. First take up the former type; 
for them, expressions (4), (8) and (10) yield 
Next, take up those whose consumption is constrained under the non-
convertible ration system. For them, expressions (5), (8) and (10) yield 
C hRBoth (20) and (21) are non-negative because p > p , and p > p • 
Thus, this entire group of individuals is better-off under non-convertible 
rations than under convertible rations. 
The intuition behind this result can be seen in two steps. First, 
under convertible rations, everyone has an incentive to buy the maximum 
quantity of rations available; consequently, this quantity equals X. 
Under non-convertible rations, there is no such incentive and, further, 
there are individuals who do not buy the maximum ration quantity; 
correspondingly, the maximum ration quantity, XR, is larger than X. 
Second, recall that the convertibility of rations implies a higher price 
of the deficit good, but also an income gain (p 
C 
- p)X • Thus, for those 
1 
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individuals whose consumption under convertible rations is larger than X 
but smaller than XR. the loss due to higher price exceeds the income 
gain from convertibility.12 
It should be emphasized that the above result is based on our 
assumption that some individuals in the economy (the poorest are among 
them) do not (or can not) buy the maximum ration quantity under the 
non-convertible ration system. This assumption, as argued earlier, is 
more realistic than to assume that everybody buys the maximum quantity 
13under the non-convertible ration system. 
IV. EXTENSIONS 
In this section, we first examine two other allocation systems (the 
queue system with secondary trade, and the bundling system), and briefly 
compare them to some of the systems discussed in the preceding sections. 
Next, we describe extensions or modifications of our results when commod­
ity taxes and administrative costs are taken into account. Finally, we 
point out certain assumptions one might have to make in using our positive 
analysis as a basis for normative comparisons of alternative systems. 
Queues with Secondary Trade: In the queue system examined earlier, an 
individual must himself stand queue able to consumein the to be the defi­
cit good. In some developing countries' cases, it is observed that 
individuals hire others (or use domestic help) to stand in queues. A 
polar representation of this type of queue system is the one in which 
there is secondary trade in the deficit good; in which case, standing in 
queues becomes a separate economic activity undertaken by only those with 
the lowest wage. Consequently, the opportunity price of the deficit good 
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is the same for all individuals; unlike in the queue system without 
secondary trade where the opportunity price is higher for those with 
higher wages. Clearly, therefore: Those with very high wages (which 
includes the rich) are better-off under the queue system with secondary 
trade than under the one without secondary trade. 
Also, introduction of secondary trade in a queue system may raise the 
wage of the group of workers with the lowest wage, because now there is 
additional demand for their labor. 14 This effect has sometimes prompted 
suggestions that the introduction of secondary trade in a queue system is 
helpful to the poor. This view may not, however, be correct under certain 
conditions; the reason for this can be qualitatively understood as 
follows. One of the possible consequences of introducing secondary trade 
in a queue system is that the waiting time per unit of the deficit good 
increases to balance the demand and the available supply of the deficit 
good. In this case, the poor face not only a higher wage but also a 
higher opportunity price of the deficit good. If the increase in their 
wage is sufficiently small (for instance, if the elasticity of their labor 
supply with respect to the wage is sufficiently large) then the poor would 
be better-off under a queue system without secondary trade than in the one 
with secondary trade. 
Bundling of the Deficit Good: One of the allocation systems which has 
sometimes been employed in developing countries entails bundling of 
goods; for instance, the quantity of the deficit good that an individual 
can buy from a government shop is proportional to the quantity of some 
other good (the 'bundled good') he buys. To understand some of the conse­
quences of such a system, we begin with the case in which there is 
secondary trade in both goods. Let (p, q) denote the unit prices of the 
21 
deficit and the bundled good at government shops, and let b denote the 
units of the deficit-good which an individual can buy when he buys a unit 
of t he bundl ed good at t hese sops.h If (PB, qB) are the equilibrium 
prices for the respective goods at which individuals exchange them, then 
the absence of arbitrage requires 
Therefore, the utility level of the individual h can be represented as 
If X~ and z 
~ 
respectively denote the quantities of the deficit and 
the bundled good consumed by the individual h under this system, then 
p
B 
and b are obtained from 
An intuitive property of the above system is that the consequence of 
bundling is the same whether secondary trade is possible in both the 
deficit and the bundled goods, or whether secondary trade is possible in 
only one of the two goods. This is because tradability of either of the 
two goods, or of both, leads to exactly the same relationship between the 
opportunity prices of the two goods. Specifically, if only the deficit 
good can be traded and if its exchange price is p
B 
• then the opportun­
ity price of the bundled good is given by qB in (22). Similarly, if 
only the bundled good can be traded and if its exchange price is q
B 
• 
then the opportunity price of the deficit good is p
B 
given by (22). 
To compare the outcome (for the poor) of the bundling system to that 
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of non-convertible rations, we obtain the following expression from (4), 
· 15(10) and (23). 
It is obvious that the sign of the above expression can be determined only 
for certain types of individuals' demand behavior. We consider here the 
case in which the income elasticities of the demand for the deficit and 
the bundled goods are constant and equal. If ~ denotes the common in-
come elasticity, then and where 
and k
2 
are positive numbers which depend on prices. Substitution of 




b • Thus, xhB = bzhB , and 
(25) equals zero. Therefore, v1R) v1B. 
Combining this conclusion with an earlier result (that convertible 
rations are better for the poor than non-convertible rations), it follows 
that: The poor are better-off under either non-convertible or convertible 
rations than they are under the bundling system. It can also be ascer­
tained, by comparing (3) to (23), that: The rich are better-off under 
non-intervention than they are under the bundling system~ provided the 
condition (15) is satisfied for I= B 
Commodity Taxes and Subsidies: We have abstracted in this paper from 
issues concerning commodity taxation. This is not because we view commod-
ity taxes to be playing an unimportant role (particularly in developing 
countries) but because many aspects of such taxes are relatively well 
understood in the literature, whereas the questions examined in this paper 
have not received adequate attention. An important generalization of the 
analysis presented earlier is, however, noteworthy. Specifically, our 
results remain unchanged if there is a tax (or subsidy) on the deficit 
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good, provided the same tax exists under all allocation systems. 
To see'this, let s denote the tax per unit of the deficit good. 
That is: (i) the price of the deficit good at government shops is 
p + s, under the ration, queue, or bundling system; (ii) under non­
intervention, s is the difference between the equilibrium price of the 
de icit goo and e . w ic h f' tish' goo ·f . . d t h price h' irms owning· d receive;
16 
(iii) the resulting budget surplus (or deficit) to the government, in each 
case, is sX per capita. Then. it can be verified that our comparisons 
among the alternative allocation systems are unaffected, regardless of 
what s is; this is because s cancels out when an individual's util-
17
ity under alternative systems is compared. In the more general case 
where commodity taxes differ under different allocation systems (leading 
to different government surpluses or deficits). it is obvious that the 
comparisons among systems would combine the implications of the allocative 
properties of alternative systems as well as those of differential tax 
policies. 
Administrative Costs: It can be ascertained that our results are 
unchanged if alternative allocation systems entail the same administrative 
cost (that is, personnel, storage and similar other costs depend only on 
the total quantity of the deficit good), and if this cost is passed on to 
the consumers through the price of the deficit good. This is because the 
effect of administrative cost, in this case, is analogous to that of a tax 
on the deficit good. 
Additional generalizations of the following kind are, therefore, also 
hI ~hl
possible: Suppose we find that V > V- when systems I and J have 
the same administrative cost, then the same conclusion holds even if the 
system J has a higher administrative cost than that of I. To see a 
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specific example, recall the result that convertible rations are better 
for the poor than non-convertible rations. Though this result was 
obtained in the context without administrative costs, it holds not only 
when the two allocation systems entail the same administrative cost, but 
also when the administrative cost of non-convertible rations is larger 
(for instance, if the cost of enforcing non-convertibility exceeds the 
cost of transacting secondary trade). An explicit modelling of adminis­
trative costs is, however, not attempted in this paper (or in much of the 
literature), because there appears to be an inadequate conceptual or 
empirical basis, at present, to formalize generalizable relationships 
between the administrative cost and the detailed nature of an allocation 
system. 
Normative Comparisons: It is possible, in principle, to use our posi-
tive analysis as a basis for conducting societal comparisons of alterna­
tive allocation systems, given any normative criterion. For instance, if 
the social comparisons were to be based on a Bergson-Samuelson welfare 
function, then such an analysis would require a calculation of the value 
of the social welfare function under each system, and a comparison of 
these values across systems. In practice, however, such comparisons face 
limitations. 
Specifically, the standard tools of marginal analysis are not usable 
in comparing alternative systems because the resulting equilibria are not 
in the neighborhood of one another. Therefore, to conduct normative com­
parisons across systems, one would need to posit specific functional forms 
for the social welfare function as well as for individuals' utility 
functions. Even then, analytical comparisons may not always be possible; 
for example, because of the discontinuity in the non-convertible ration 
18
system. Social comparisons, thus, may require considerably more 
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detailed assumptions concerning the parameters of the economy than what we 
. t. . 19f ound to b e necessary f or our pos1 1ve compar1sons. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Allocation systems such as rationing and queues are extensively em­
ployed in many developing countries and centrally planned economies. In 
this paper, we have compared the consequences of several basic types of 
such systems with one another, and with that of unhindered market (non­
intervention). Our analysis has concentrated on positive comparisons: we 
have attempted to ascertain, for each pair of allocation systems, whether 
a specific group of individuals (particularly the poor and the rich) is 
better-off under one system or another. The results and insights obtained 
from these comparisons are valid and informative, regardless of the social 
criterion or political reasons based on which a government might choose an 
allocation system. 
We recognize that there is a great diversity in the structures and the 
economic outcomes of the allocation systems that are employed in different 
contexts. In this paper, we have used relatively simple models to depict 
alternative allocation systems and have focussed on the comparisons of 
their outcomes within an important class of circumstances when the supply 
of a good is limited. Within this class, our results are robust not only 
to parameters such as the quantity of the deficit good available in the 
economy, and its unit cost, but also to certain types of commodity taxes 
and administrative costs. Moreover, the results concerning the compari­
sons among various government managed systems (that is, among rationing, 
queues, and the bundling system) hold even when the quantity of the 
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deficit good to be distributed among individuals is a policy choice, 
rather than a datum for the economy. The corresponding comparison between 
a government managed system and non-intervention would, of course, be 
affected by the nature of supply response; the present paper has not 
analyzed this important case. 
Also. for both the queue and the ration system, we have considered two 
polar specifications: one in which there is no secondary trade and the 
other in which there is full secondary trade. In some countries, inter­
mediate cases are observed in which partial secondary trade is conducted 
in underground markets, in contravention of the formal law. In such cases, 
different individuals participate in these underground markets to various 
degrees depending, in part, on their incomes and risk-aversion, on the 
difference between the prices at the government shops and in the under­
ground markets, and on the nature of the legal enforcement system. We 
hope that comparisons of the outcomes of these and other specifications of 
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1. These systems have been employed (and have been a source of important 
controversies) in developed countries as well, particularly during 
external hostilities and embargoes. 
2. Intermediate cases of rationing and queues in which the deficit good 
is partially convertible in underground markets are briefly discussed 
at the end of the paper. 
3. The social criterion used is as follows. An ideal distribution of the 
consumption of the deficit good is posited and, then. the social loss 
under an allocation system is defined to be the sum (over the indivi­
duals) of the square of the deviation of the actual distribution of 
consumption (under the system) from the ideal distribution. The two 
allocation systems are then compared on the basis of the respective 
social losses. Rivera-Batiz (1981) extends this analysis by adding a 
cubic term to the definition of the social loss. 
4. Specifically, Bucovetsky (1984) derives the optimal (multi-person 
Ramsey-like) rule when the government uses queues. in addition to com­
modity taxes. Younes (1984) derives the optimal rule when the addi­
tional instrument is rationing. Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) contrast 
the commodity structure of optimal rations and taxes. 
5. There are many economic reasons (such as the unavailability of infor­
mation, and the limitations on third-party enforceability) why only 
simple allocation systems. such as those considered in this paper, are 
typically feasible. Specifically, we do not consider mechanisms such 
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as nonlinear pricing schemes (with arbitrary nonlinearities), because 
such schemes are never feasible for consumption goods. For a discus-
sion of some of these economic reasons in the context of taxation in 
developing countries, see Sah and Stiglitz (1985). 
6. The present paper is also unrelated to the work of Kornai and others 
[see Kornai (1980), Kornai and Martos (1981), and Hare (1982)] which 
addresses issues such as control, communication and the endogeneity of 
shortages in models of centrally planned economies. To the extent 
this work addresses the effects of non-price allocation systems on 
consumers, its emphasis is on describing these effects for specific 
allocation systems rather than on comparing the consequences of alter-
native systems. 
7. The expression (1) captures the notion that there is a 'shortage' of 
the deficit good at the 'desired' price level. In fact, it is under 
these conditions that governments typically intervene by employing 
allocation systems such as rations or queues. Also, unless explicitly 
needed, we suppress some of the arguments of the demand function and 
the indirect utility function; in particular, the prices of 
non-deficit goods, and the individual's wage rate are suppressed. 
8. In those contexts where non-intervention is not a feasible alternative 
(for instance, when the deficit good is produced in the public 
sector), p is the unit cost to the government. 
denotes the price derivative of the aggregate de-
b h M m + a (p - p)X) , then we are assuming that 
D p < 0 regardless of how a's are distributed among individuals. 
What this assumption means, in more elementary terms, can be seen as 
h h hfollows. First, note that D = pih (x + a Xx ) , whereP P m 
• • 
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h h h x =ax/am • Using a Slutsky relationship,m 
\..h h h_ hM hu+ Lu xm(a----X - x ) , where xp is the price 
response of the compensated demand of an individual. For brevity, 
denote the two terms in the •right hand side of the last expression as 
and Clearly, Dpl < 0 , since xhu < 0 from a standard p 
property of the compensated demand (we assume that there is some pos­
sibility of substitution in an individual's choices). Thus, our re­
striction that DP is negative- means that either (i) DP is non-
2 
positive, or (ii) DP is positive but it is dominated by Dpl. An2 
example where DP is zero is when individuals have linear Engel2 
curves with identical slopes. For this example, it is easy to verify 
that D p is automatically negative. 
hR >10. To see that p p note from (5) that avhR/aXR = µh(phR - p) 
where µ 
h 
is the (positive) marginal utility of income for this per-
son. Also avhRtaxR is positive because this person wants to con-
hRsume more of the deficit good. Hence, p > p • 
11. Note that in the derivation of (16), the utility level of the rich 
under non-convertible rations is given by (5) because their consump­
tion of the deficit good is constrained under this system. 
12. This analysis is based on a different logic than that in Baumol 
(1982). In the latter, salable and non-salable ration points are 
examined under the assumption that individuals have envy towards each 
others' consumption bundles, and that the social criterion is that of 
fairness. 
13. Under the latter assumption, it is easily verified that convertible 
rations are weakly Pareto superior to non-convertible rations. 
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14. For simplicity, we assume that the same group of individua.ls remains 
at·-the bottom of the wage distribution even after an increase in 
their wage. 
15. Note that q is the market price of the bundled good under alloca­
tion systems other than the bundling system. Also, since the 
opportunity price of the bundled good differs under the two alloca­
tion systems presently being compared, a slight extension of (10) is 
required to derive (25.). Specifically, if qr and qr represent 
the opportunity prices of the bundled good under allocation systems 
I and r and if zhJ is the quantity of this good consumed by 
person h under the system r, then the term (qr - qI)zhJ is 
added to the right side of (10). 
16. The expression 'non-intervention' is somewhat awkward here, but the 
economic meaning should be apparent. 
17. This generalization assumes that the relationship (1) is satisfied at 
the consumer price p + s ; that is, the market demand at price 
p + s exceeds the supply of the deficit good. Also, note that if 
the price of the deficit good at government shops is very low (due to 
a large subsidy) then everyone would buy the maximum ration quantity 
under the non-convertible ration system. The consequence of such a 
possibility has already been discussed in the preceding analysis. 
18. The operational problem in this case is analogous to the one faced by 
Blinder and Rosen (1985) in analyzing notches (jumps) in social 
policy. Also note that the limitations on social comparisons that 
are being pointed out here exist even if the social criterion is 
something other than a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. 
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19. There may be exceptions, however. For instance, if the social com­
parisons were to be conducted on the basis of the Rawlsian criterion, 
then the results would be the same as those we have obtained for the 
poorest group of individuals. 
32 
APPENDIX 1 
Let eh denote the expenditure function for person h; that is, 
hJ h( hJ hJm = e p , V ) • 
Clearly: ~I> VhJ, if 0h >·o. This is because higher 
utility costs more at any given prices. Now using the definition of the 
expenditure function, one can reexpress 0h as 
Next, among the standard properties of an expenditure function are that it 
is concave in prices, and that its derivatives with respect to prices 
equal an individual's consumption quantities. Further, if we assume that 
there is some possibility of substitution in the consumption choice of an 
individual, then 
Substituting (27) into (26) and using the definition (10), one obtains: 
0h > Ah(I, J) • Finally, recall from above that: yhI) yhJ. if 
0h) 0. It follows then that 
(28) if A
h 
(I, .T) 2. 0 • 
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